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Abstract 
This paper deals with the ex-ante analysis of the effects of farm subsidies on farm behaviour. Beside that the risk 
factor is implemented in the farm model to reflect and quantify potential (negative) impact on farm results. A 
farm-level optimization model is used to assess the effects of different kind of policies and risk on production 
structure, income indicators and land use management. It appeared that a reasonable level of risk (via income 
variation)  have  impact,  but  not  significant.  If  liberalisation  would  have  happened  (zero  direct  and 
disadvantageous  payments)  production  would  homogenised,  30%  of  land  would  remained  abandoned, 
production  and  income  would  clearly  decline.  Other  scenario  points  out  that  environmental  objectives  (here 
through  more  extensively  managed  land)  could  not  be  necessarily  more  costly,  but  in  such  a  case  without 
accompanying livestock. To increase profitable livestock production requires to provide grassland and animal 
payments above the current level (obviously in addition to stimulating production economizing) whereas both 
payments should be conditional to each other.  
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Anotace 
Příspěvek  je  zaměřený  na  ex-ante  analýzu  možných  vlivů  zemědělských  podpor  na  chování  (rozhodování) 
zemědělců. Navíc je model obohacen o vliv faktoru rizika při rozhodování a tudíž možnost vyhodnotit případné 
(negativní) dopady do hospodaření podniku. K analýze je použit optimalizační  model na úrovni farmy,  který 
umožňuje vyčíslit dopady různých typů zemědělských politik-scénářů (včetně analýzy rizika) do oblasti výrobní 
struktury, příjmových ukazatelů a užití půdy. Bylo zjištěno, že při uvažování rizika by bylo částečně hospodaření 
podniku ovlivněno. Liberální scénář (znamená nulové přímé platby a platby na LFA) by vedl k nižší diverzitě 
pěstovaných plodin, 30 % půdy by zůstalo neobhospodařovaných a produkce i příjmy by se snížily. Zlepšení 
péče o půdu prostřednictvím většího podílu extensivně obhospodařovaných ploch nemusí znamenat nutně vyšší 
náklady;  v tomto  případě  ovšem  bez  adekvátního  zvýšení  chovaných  zvířat.  Ke  zvýšení  rozsahu  chovaných 
zvířat (přežvýkavců) by bylo  zapotřebí u vybrané  typové struktury podniku (vedle zvýšení účinnosti vstupů) 
navýšit podporu travních porostů a platbu na zvíře (top-up) nad současnou úroveň, přičemž obě platby by měly 
být vzájemně provázané. 
Klíčová slova 
Zemědělská politika, hodnocení rizika, faremní model, přímé platby.
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Introduction       
Decision  about  land  allocation  among  farm 
activities  is  an  important  aspect  in  farming 
businesses  with  several  economic  (farm  revenues, 
cash-flow),  socio-managerial  (input,  capital  and 
labour  allocation)  and  environmental  (landscape 
mosaic,  soil  erosion  threat,  diversity,  etc.) 
implications.  At  the  same  time,  nature,  climate, 
developments  in  markets,  technology  and  societal 
concerns generate many types of risks. In this paper 
we look at two phenomena determining decisions: 
provision of (income) subsidies and the role of risk. 
Both  are  highly  relevant  not  only  for  individual 
producers  but  for  policy  makers  as  well  with 
regards to: i) allocation of national direct payments 
to certain targets, ii) directing policies after 2013 – 
first  draft  of  policy  is  just  communicated,  iii) 
expectation  on  the  increasing  fluctuation  of  farm 
incomes  (changing  condition  on  climate  and 
markets).  We  implemented  the  effects  resulting 
from  subsidies  (area  payments  plus 
agroenvironmental payments) into simulation to see 
the  shifts  between  intensive  and  extensive  land 
managements.  The  analysis  focuses  on  a  farmers´ 
possibility to adjust production structure according 
to economic results. A particular attention is given 
to incentives that stimulate cattle breeding which is 
thought be a sector potentially threatened if special 
support  is  not  provided.  An  optimization 
mathematical  model  FARMA  4  (Foltýn,  et.  al. 
2007)  is  used.  The  concepts  of  risk  finds  its 
theoretical  justification  in  the  expected  utility 
maximisation decision model (Robinson and Barry, 
1987),  where  the  risk  of  the  crop  production  is 
usually  defined  in  terms  of  the  levels  of  income 
variability associated with different states of nature 
(lower  expected  income).  This  variability  results 
from price (market risk) and yield (production risk) 
fluctuations. 
Farmers´ decision is not static but rather it is inter-
linked:  economists  often  assume  that  risk 
consideration  has  been  related  to  the  existence  of 
safety  net:  obviously  such  safety  net  may  not  be 
provided only by  governmental payments but also 
off-farm revenues (or other types of income). Yet, 
not only the existence of certain support is crucial 
for decision but also the type or criteria the payment 
is distributed or whether it is tied to production or 
not. In this sense Bhaskar and Beghin (2010) state 
that  in  the  presence  of  uncertainty,  decoupled 
payments  reduce  the  coefficient  of  risk  aversion 
(they call it as wealth effect) and income variability 
(as insurance effect). OECD (2008) view decoupled 
payments  rather  as  providing  compensation  and 
adjustment assistance, rather than as a fundamental 
policy  of  income  support  to  farmers.  In  fact,  that 
has  impact  on  the  way  how  payments  are  spent: 
more  progressive  farmers  declared  they  tend  to 
invest  them what basically confirms the existence 
of production linkage.  
The  aim  of  this  contribution  is:  i)  to  ex-ante 
estimate  production  and  income  effect  of  direct 
payments  reduction  (full  liberalization  as  an 
extreme  scenario);  ii)  how  risk-averse  behaviour 
might influence farmers results and iii) to simulate 
(calculate)  a  sort  of  compensation  payment  when 
shift  in  production  intensity  is  followed  on  a 
selected typical Czech farm.    
Risk behaviour in the literature 
Omitting risk and uncertainty in decision has been 
criticised in the neoclassical theory of the firm since 
the 1960s. Over the last decades, better insight has 
been  developed  about  risk  assessment,  risk 
preferences and value of information.  Harwood et 
al.  (1999)  offer  specific  definition  of  risk.  They 
define  risk  as  uncertainty  that  “matters”  and  may 
involve  the  probability  of  losing  money,  possible 
harm  to  human  health,  repercussions  that  affect 
resources  (irrigation,  credit),  and  other  types  of 
events that affect a person’s welfare. Uncertainty (a 
situation in which a person does not know for sure 
what will happen) is necessary for risk to occur, but 
uncertainty need not lead to a risky situation. In this 
paper  we  concentrate  on  pure  risk  which  is 
considered  as  downside  risk
2  only,  although  the 
business  risk  usually  incorporates  both  downside 
and upside risk
3. 
The  literature  on  farmers’  risk  exposure  usually 
covers either price risk or yield risk. A closer look 
at price risk provided e.g. OECD (1993), Ray et al. 
(1998),  Harwood  et  al.  (1999)  and  Goodwin, 
Roberts,  Coble  (2000).  They  focused  on  the 
variability  and  estimation  of  the  probability 
distribution  of  agricultural  output  prices.  Studies 
differ in the length of the measured period, locality, 
                                                           
2  Downside  risk  means  the  likelihood  of  only 
negative  deviation  of  the  critical  variable  (i.  e. 
negative consequences if risk occurs). 
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type of price (future price, spot price, export price), 
method of adjustment of the time series (deflating, 
detrending,  using  nominal  prices)  and  time  scale 
(usually  average  annual  price  or average  monthly 
price). Most of authors have used the coefficient of 
variation  as  the  tool  for  the  assessment  of  price 
volatility. The regional aspect is very important for 
the  interpretation  of  results  because  market 
interventions and market price support vary widely 
across the world.   
Yield risk is the second essential part of the income 
risk of agricultural enterprises. Many authors have 
tried  to  estimate  the  probability  distribution  of 
natural yields of various crops but there is no clear 
evidence  of  the  kind  of  skewness  (Day,  1965  vs. 
Ramirez,  1997  or  Harwood  et.  al,  1999).  For  the 
purpose of this paper it is necessary to point out the 
influence of spatial aggregation of yield data on the 
distortion of yield variance. Regional average data 
reflects  the  regional  randomness  or  risk  factors 
which are common to all farmers in the region. On 
the  other  hand,  individual  variability  of  natural 
yield  can  be  caused  by  management  failures  or 
local  weather  conditions.  Hence  using  spatially 
aggregated data is not suitable for the estimation of 
individual  farmers  risk  exposure  (Harwood  et  al, 
1999,  Popp,  Rudstrom,  Manning,  2005). 
Furthermore, the results of  these empirical studies 
revealed a different nature of yield and price risks 
in agriculture. The  natural yields are low spatially 
correlated and the rate of yield risk depends on the 
climate  and  weather  features,  soil  properties, 
technology of production and other predominantly 
natural  variables.  Estimates  of  yield  probability 
distribution require the most individualized data. 
In  connection  with  natural  risks,  some  research 
teams  have  been  dealing  with  specific  underlying 
risks faced by farmers, such as epidemic diseases or 
climate  change  (e.g.  publications  of  LEI 
Wageningen).  
The  correlation  between  price  and  yield  volatility 
has been considered in risk analysis as well. From 
the  results  of  empirical  studies  (e.g.  Weisensel, 
Shoney,  1989,  Coble,  Heifner,  Zuniga,  2000) 
implicitly  follows  the  assumption  that  open 
economies  (markets)  show  lower  correlation 
between output prices and natural yields than more 
isolated  economies.  Correlation  coefficients  also 
depend on  the crop, growing conditions, access to 
storage capacities and the level of contracting.   
The  agrarian  policy  is  another  significant  factor 
determining the level of farm income and farmers’ 
behaviour.  Since  discussions  on  the  topic  of 
suitable risk management schemes have taken place 
at a global level, some studies of risk management 
tools  in  agriculture  have  been  published.  The 
OECD  publications  (2000,  2009)  may  be 
considered  as  significant  and  relatively 
comprehensive studies of income risk management 
in  agriculture.  The  overview  of  the  European 
agricultural  risk  management  schemes  was 
introduced in the common research project EC-JRC 
Ispra  Italy  with  data  contributed  from  European 
countries  (Bielza  et  al.,  2006).  This  study 
constituted  the  basis  for  analyzing  strategies  to 
integrate  risk  management  tools  within  the 
Common  Agricultural Policy (CAP). The strategic 
objective  of  the  parallel  research  projects  was  to 
analyze the potential of different risk  management 
tools for stabilizing farm household incomes in the 
EU (Meuwissen et al., 2008).  
Some  papers  also  examined  the  relationship 
between  the  farmers’  operating  risk  and  current 
subsidies.  Based  on  the  simulation  at  the 
commodity level the results revealed that partially 
or  fully  decoupled  payments  extend  the  farmers’ 
decision-making possibilities. The current subsidies 
(in Czech agriculture) are a suitable complement to 
other  commonly  used  risk  management  tools 
primarily  designed  to  reduce  the  farmers’  income 
volatility and farm income volatility (Špička et al., 
2009).  
Data and methods 
Prices (and variations) were collected from  Czech 
Statistical  Office  and  calculated  for  a  period 
between  1991  –  2009
4.  Cost  structure  of 
characteristic farm types was taken from an annual 
survey  carried  out  by  IAEI  (Poláčková,  et.  al., 
2009). It provides a standard costs assignment  for 
each commodity included in a survey in a regional 
classification (maize, sugar-beet, potatoes, potatoes-
                                                           
4  For  some  commodities  the  period  had  to  be 
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oats,  mountainous).  Data  on  yields  (and  monthly 
variations)  were  calculated  for  time  period  2007-
2010.  
We  use  a  mathematical  static  farm  optimization 
model  (FARMA  4,  Foltýn  et.  al.,  2007)  which 
simulate  behaviour  of  selected  farm  types.  An 
optimization function is  
TC TS TR − + = π max , 
where π is a farm profit
5, TR is total revenue (from 
crop and livestock activities), TS is total subsidies. 
Production  (and  revenues)  are  endogenously 
determined  based  on  the  area  and  number  of 
animals calculated, respectively. Unit payments are 
exogenously  given  either  as  area  payments  or 
commodity  payments  (if  applicable).  TC  is  total 
costs  including  labour  and  fixed  costs.  Costs  are 
linear
6  and  thus  do  not  assume  scale  efficiencies. 
Beside  factor  (and  nutrients)  restrictions  there  are 
also  “agro-environmental”  options  which  allow 
simulating  more  “environmental”  sensitive 
behaviour and related economic effects. This is e.g. 
positive  balance  of  organic  fertilizers,  elimination 
of  erosion  threats,  balance  of  nutrients.  Model 
simulates both crop and livestock activities whereas 
there  are  possible  two  management  strategies  for 
crops:  intensive  and  extensive.  Extensive 
management is usually given a subsidy as stimulus. 
It  enables  to  assess  the  trade-offs  between  more 
profitable  intensive  scenario  against  more 
environmental sensitive extensive one.  
Risk  is  taken  into  account  through  subtraction  of 
the variation in yield
7 (income-variance criterion) as 
follows: 
φλ − = av ex Y Y
 , 
                                                           
5  Alternatively  it  can  be  altered  to  value  added 
(external factors are not deducted from revenues ) 
or gross margin objective function. 
6  In  the  version  applied  here.  By  using  positive 
mathematical programming algorithm (e.g. Howit, 
2005) it allows cost function to be non-linear and 
thus  reducing  the  need  for  further  production 
constraints. 
7 Model enable also to  implement price variation. 
For this simulation this option was off.  
where  Yup  is  expected  yield,  Yav  is  the  average 
yield,  φ is  an  exogenously  determined  risk-averse 
coefficient  indicating  to  what  extent  the  farmer 
avoids risk (parameter close to zero indicates risk 
neutrality and the value close to one implies risk-
averse  behaviour)  and  λ  is  the  variance  of  yield, 
respectively.  Yields  are  endogenous  parameters 
depending  on  the  management.  Yield  variation  is 
not  provided  for  livestock  commodities  and  for 
some crops (this assumption substitutes agronomic 
limits in the crop rotation). Extensively cultivated 
crops are supposed to exhibit large yield variation 
and that is reflected in the  model as well. Precise 
data  for  yield  and  variations  are  given  in  the 
appendix (Table A1).   
For  the  analysis  a  typical  farm  representing 
“average conditions” of the Czech Republic (half of 
territory designed as LFA) was selected. The farm 
represents  corresponding  production  and  cost 
structure  for  such  territory  (although  the  size  is 
rather normative).  
The  following  assumptions  have  been  applied 
between crop and animal production: i) the farm is 
assumed to be self-sufficient in forage and straw via 
required  energy  intake,  ii)  animals  receive  the 
required  amount  of  feed  and  roughage,  which 
satisfies the ingredient and nutrient restrictions, iii) 
animal transactions (buying and selling) are made at 
the  start  of  the  planning  period  and  these 
transactions  are  restricted,  iv)  animals  are 
categorised into calves, heifers (dairy and suckler), 
suckler  cows,  dairy  cows,  fattening  beef,  v)  all 
crops produced are sold or used as animal feed or 
seeds. No storage costs are assumed. 
As  previously  outlined  an  objective  is  to  see  the 
possible  effects  of  introducing  certain  types  of 
policies  (coupled  or  decoupled  payments)  on 
production  structure,  crop  management,  livestock 
density  and  economic  results.  We  applied  6 
scenarios, in more details are presented in the table 
below. The first one serves as a “Baseline” scenario 
(without  risk  consideration),  the  remaining  ones 
simulates  either  more  liberalised  conditions  or 
provision of environmental or livestock payments:  
the “Current policy” scenario explores the effects of 
risk  implementation  and  other  parameters  are  the 
same  as  in  “Baseline”,  the  next  scenario 
(“Liberalized”)  is  used  to  look  at  on  the  extreme 
effects  resulting  from  complete  subsidy  cut.  The Risk and Subsidies in Czech Agriculture - an ex-ante Analysis of Farmers´ Decision-making 
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Scenario  Description  Risk  
“Baseline”  Policy as for 2009: no difference in subsidies between intensive and 
extensive  management,  area  payment  188  €/ha  (SAPS+top-up 
2009),  no  payment  for  livestock;  Agro-envi  programmes  do  not 
apply; production limits max 200% of initial level. 
No 
“Current policy”  Policy  and  production  limits  applied  as  in  “Baseline”,  risk 
implemented. 
Yes 
“Liberalized”  No subsidies for any crop and management; Agro-envi programmes 
do not apply as well, production limits as in “Baseline”. 
Yes 
“Environmental”  Intensive  management  is  not  supported,  crops  with  extensive 
management receive 282 €/ha, extensive grassland 564 €/ha, in fact 
zero crop limits, livestock maximum 200% of initial level. 
Yes 
“Livestock on grass”  =”Environemtnal” scenario, beside that livestock subsidy 392 €/LU 
(coupled payment).  
Yes 
“Livestock oriented”  =”Livestock on grass”, extensive grass management do not receive 
subsidy. 
Yes 
Table 1. Description of scenarios applied in the model FARMA 4. 
 
 
Graph A1. Land use in scenario break down (in % relation to “Baseline”). 
 
 “Environmental”  assumes  support  provision  for 
extensive  management and do  not limit  maximum 
of  individual  crop  area.  In  addition  to  this 
“Livestock  on  grass”  provides  additional  payment 
for  each  livestock  unit  (LU)  and  its  aim  is  to 
envisage  potential  to  increase  livestock  ruminants 
on grassland. The last scenario “Livestock oriented” 
relates  to  the  previous  one  but  does  not  provide 
support  for  grassland  to  see  potential  livestock 
restructuralization. 
Model results 
The following section describes the outcomes of the 
model  for  selected  scenarios.  All  scenarios  are 
expressed  relative  to  “Baseline”  scenario  until 
otherwise  stated.  Three  areas  are  of  high  interest: 
land  use  changes,  animal  structures  (animal 
density), economic results. 
Land use  
Czech  agriculture  applies  Common  Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) since 2004. Pillar one consists, beside 
market  interventions,  of  direct  payments  paid  as 
single  area  payments  (SAPS),    national  financed 
direct payments for area and for certain crops and 
animals (top-ups), payment for sugar-beet growers, 
and  payments  for  dairy  cows.  In  the  model  we 
therefore implemented SAPS and top-ups crop area 
payments.  In  respective  scenario  top-up  payment 
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consists  of  structural  assistance  payments  (not 
applicable  here),  agro-environmental  payments 
(payment  to  compensate  either  income  loss  or 
higher  costs  due  to  specific  management 
application, usually on grassland) and payments for 
less  favourite  areas.  We  implemented  agri-
environmental  subsidies  via  area  payments  for 
extensive  management  and  for  grassland 
management.  
Total utilised agricultural area was used completely 
in all scenarios except the “Liberalised” one. Here, 
some  30%  of  UAA  remained  abandoned  (a  few 
individual  crop  area  limits  were  fulfilled).  Land 
abandonment used to be often placed as a threat by 
professional groups which, as simulation shows, is 
not be so dramatic under current policies. 
Implementation of risk into model does not change 
production  structure  significantly  (only  small 
changes are observed inside intensive or extensive 
commodity  groups;  variation  in  livestock  was  not 
considered),  see  graph  A1  in  the  Appendix. 
Notably,  extensively  cultivated  wheat  got  more 
attention  if  risk  was  implemented  (though  yield 
variation in extensive scenario was higher  than in 
intensive). Yet the opposite is true for barley – its 
profitability  in  extensive  management  was 
outweighed  by  winter  wheat  which  has  lower 
variation than barley. “Liberalized” scenario leads 
to reduction of most cash crops (particularly roots), 
grassland remains unchanged at the end (intensive 
grass  disappeared  in  favour  of  extensive 
management  on  pasture).  Hence  extensive  crop 
production  did  not  expanded  on  the  expense  of 
intensive crops (partially due to larger variation for 
extensive  crops  than  for  intensive  management). 
The  next  two  scenarios  (“Enviromental”  and 
“Livestock on grass”, recalling that extensive crops 
and  grassland  get  more  supports  compared  to  the 
previous ones) exhibit decrease in some cash crops, 
except  potatoes,  but  increase  of  maize  and 
particularly grassland (solely extensively  managed 
grass due to higher supports; it contributed also to 
sharp drop in cattle density on grass). However, in 
the  “Environmental”  scenario  livestock  remained 
unchanged  in  absolute  figures  (graph  A2  in  the 
Appendix). Scenario (“Livestock orientation”) due 
to  zero  grassland  support  (only  ruminants  are 
supported)  indirectly  allowed  cash  crops  (grains 
and oilseeds) to be allocated on land (and even root 
crops  raised  up).  In  this  scenario  livestock 
surprisingly  did  not  get  maximum  possible  level 
(grassland  area  was  reduced  due  to  diminished 
subsidy) although largely supported (392 € per LU). 
It  follows  that  even  payment  which  is  3  times 
higher than the real current level still does not make 
a  sufficient  incentive  for  increasing  beef  cattle 
stock.  In  this  scenario  (“Livestock  orientation”), 
cattle density on grass remained on the “Baseline” 
level due to drop in total grass and relative increase 
of cattle stock.  The largest expansion of livestock 
was  recorded  in  “Livestock  on  grass”  scenario 
where  both  –  LU  and  extensive  grassland 
management  –  is  largely  supported.  Results 
regarding livestock clearly suggest that only strong 
impetus  (animal  and  area  support)  is  capable  to 
increase  animal  breeding.  Under  simulated 
conditions suckler cows - eligible to be supported - 
are getting the attention when receiving as much as 
around 390 € per LU plus support for grassland 3 
times  higher  than  area  payment  in  2009.  Notably 
milk  production  did  not  increase  across  any 
scenario  even  despite  setting  the  prices  on  pre-
recession level. Non-ruminants (this category were 
not directly supported in the model) still remained 
on the minimum level allowed by the model. 
Economic results 
The interpretation of economic results needs to be 
done  in  relation  to  the  assumptions  and  often  to 
strict rules existing in  the  model.  However, many 
production  specificities  (eg.  costs  of  structural 
adjustment)  will  still  remain  outside  the  model 
consideration. As expected the most visible drop of 
production  and  income  indicators  took  place  in 
“Liberalized”  scenario  followed  by  “Current 
policy”. Contrary to other scenarios, profit declined 
in these two scenarios by more than 60% and 20%, 
respectively.  This  is  also  due  to  the  fact  that 
scenario without subsidies do not exploited even all 
land  available.  Moreover  if  production  limits  on 
certain crops would not be restricted the abandoned 
land could be possibly even larger. Hence, intensive 
management  dominates  in  subsidy-zero  scenario 
(but still total production would drop by more than 
40% in “Liberalized” scenario). Production do  not 
decline as fast as profit.  It  needs to  have in  mind 
that  if  risky  expectation  yields  would  not  have 
finally  realized  production  would  not  differ  as 
much.  Looking  at  “Current  policy”  scenario  it 
confirms  that  area-based  payment  is  partially 
capable  of  stimulating  extensively  cultivated  cash 




Graph A2. Cattle density according to scenarios break down (in % relation to “Baseline”) 
 
 
Graph A3. Farm economic results according to scenarios break down (in % relation to “Baseline”). 
 
scenario  could  be  also  a  proxy  simulation  for 
extreme  weather  conditions  when  yields  drop 
down.  It  shows  that  though  production  would 
diminished by 6% profit would be down by some 
20%.  “Environmental”  and  “Livestock  on  grass” 
scenarios  lead  to  profit  increase;  it  is  caused  by 
increasing supports for both intensive and extensive 
land  management  and  setting  the  crop  production 
limits  less  strict  (resulting  in  reallocation  of  land 
even  into  more  profitable  crops).  Although 
production and profit do not differ significantly, the 
“Livestock on grass” is “more costly” for taxpayers: 
increase  in  subsidies  (+  29%),  in  the 
“Environmental”  scenario  (+  4%),  both  in 
comparison with the “Baseline”. Such trend is also  
visible  as  for  “Livestock  orientation”  where 
production neither gross income do not decline but 
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relation  to  base  situation.  Nevertheless,  difference 
between  these  two  last  scenarios  is  caused  by 
various  revenue  sources:  “Livestock  orientation” 
generates  more  revenues  from  cash  crops  than  in 
the  “Livestock  on  grass”  scenario.  Hence  from 
policy perspective this is relatively cheapest option 
but does not contribute to animal production change 
(both  categories  -  ruminant  and  non-ruminant). 
From environmental perspective there is a clear lost 
of extensively farmed grass in favour of arable land 
(cash  crops  and  fodder  on  arable  land)  in 
“Livestock  orientation”  scenario.  Unit  subsidies 
(per  ha  UAA)  are  approximately  239  Euro  in  the 
scenario  with  the  largest  share  of  grassland 
(“Livestock  on  grass”)  but  without  any  effect  on 
cattle density.  
Conclusions 
The paper tries to contribute to the discussion about 
direction  of  Czech  agriculture  while  the  political 
relevance  for  these  projections  is  twofold:  to 
anticipate the effects of changes after 2013 (though 
specific policy is not considered in this period) and 
to  support  decision  about  direction  of  national 
policies (including  the application of an article 68 
of  Council  Direction  1782/2003)  in  2011-  2013. 
Model  implemented  market  parameters  (prices) 
according  to  OECD  projections  (but  without 
incorporating  significant  drops  related  to  global 
recession  to  avoid  extreme  model  solutions). 
Typical  farm  represented  average  agro-ecological 
production conditions. Based on that, the following 
observations can be drawn: 
−  Only  highly  profitable  crop  commodities 
would be produced (eg. rape seed) if direct 
payments  completely  vanish.  Livestock 
production  is  mostly  not  profitable  even 
under  current  conditions.  Therefore 
liberalized  conditions  (abolished  direct  and 
compensatory  payments)  would  likely  lead 
to  land  abandonment,  livestock  breeding 
would  cease.  That  would  obviously  cause 
several negative effects, for example on the 
soil  fertility  deterioration  due  to  organic 
matter lost.  
−  If environmental compensatory payments are 
introduced in less favourite areas their total 
profitability  is  ensured  even  under  risk 
consideration (meaning smooth reduction in 
yield  variation)  that  guarantees  their 
production. 
−  Under current conditions in livestock sector, 
certain  beef  breeding  can  be  guaranteed 
either  by  administrative  rules  that  require 
minimum livestock density or by introducing 
coupled animal payment which however has 
to  be  higher  than  currently  applied 
(50 €/LU). 
−  If  yield  variation  in  intensive  areas  (land 
management)  is  considered  it  may  easily 
reduce  revenue  to  the  level  currently 
achieved by extensive management. In such 
a  case  that  would  impose  certain  income 
threat on  those farms operating in intensive 
areas as compensatory payments are unlikely 
to be introduced here. 
The  concept  of  risk  was  defined  in  this  paper  in 
terms  of  income  variability  and  to  some  extent 
“normalised” for a decision-making; it is clear that 
perception  of  risk  is  very  specific.  However  the 
risk-attitude (here only as a prevention against price 
and  yield deviations) also mirrors the institutional 
conditions surrounding farmers (access to external 
financing,  market  transparency,  access  to 
information, etc.). In this sense one may assume the 
more developed and flexile environment the  more 
likely farmers will be willing to accept higher risk. 
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